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Needed.Uniform Utility Rate Laws
Robert E. Loew*
A S COSTS CONTINUE TO CLIMB and the present inflationary trend
snowballs, utilities and especially telephone companies must
rid themselves of previous levels of curtailed revenues or sink
into profitless oblivion. It is not their choice. The telephone
companies, Bell and Independent, cannot help themselves. They
cannot hold back the inflationary trend. Time and time again,
as in the past several years, the telephone companies are going
to find it necessary to petition their state regulatory bodies for
increased rates. This is not only true for the telephone industry
but it is certainly true for all utility companies which wish to
survive.
Making ends meet is not the only problem; nor is the start-
ing of a rate application. The real problem lies in the lack of
consistent standards as to what are the reasonable revenue re-
quirements of a utility-telephone-company. In the past the com-
panies have petitioned commission after commission for rate re-
lief, only to have their wants cut in half due to a lack of under-
standing of what is the reasonable rate.
A reasonable rate is one which enables the telephone com-
panies to render adequate service to the users and which is suf-
ficiently adequate to attract investment capital to meet future
expansion demands. A reasonable rate is not one that permits
the companies to make just enough money to continue present
services. The American public expects and demands the best of
every commodity-just as they do from utility service. Without
sufficient profits to permit-expansion, new products and serv-
ices, and research-development, the utility companies would
soon go out of business, or worse yet be taken over by govern-
ment, which as is commonly known is not to the best interests of
a free-enterprise society.
This study consists of an analysis of the statutory standards,
court decisions, and utility commission decisions used in fixing
telephone or other utility rates, where the same are used regard-
less of the nature of the utility, in each of fifty-one jurisdictions
in the United States.
A review of all jurisdictions indicates that there are at least
three telephone rate making standards in existence-"fair value,"
"permissive value," and "just and reasonable." Iowa' does not at
* A.B. (in Economics), Youngstown Univ.; Advertising Supervisor of
Public Relations Dept. of Ohio Bell Telephone Co.; Third-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 At this time telephone service is not regulated in the State of Iowa.
However, for the purposes of this article, telephone rate making standards
have been based on those established for the electric and gas industries
under West's Iowa Code Anno. Ch. 397.28.
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this time have a statute governing telephone rates. Statutes in
four states-Alabama, 2 Missouri,3 New York,4 and Ohio'-re-
quire that in fixing reasonable rates, the commissions must allow
or give consideration to "value" or "fair return on value." A
"fair value" rate base is used and required in three states-
Minnesota,6 Texas,7 and Mississippi.s For the purposes of this
paper six of the above states have been classified as "fair value"
jurisdictions. Mississippi, under a recent court decision,9 con-
trary to that required by its statute, has been classified as a "just
and reasonable" jurisdiction. Iowa, which does not have rate
regulation of telephone companies either state-wide or local, has
been classified as a "fair value" jurisdiction because of standards
used in setting electric and gas rates.
In the District of Columbia,'0 and twenty-nine states, the
statutes contain a valuation section but do not expressly require
that "value" be used in fixing "just and reasonable" rates. Of
these, Arizona,"' Delaware, 12 Illinois,'1 Indiana,' 4 Maryland,'
Montana,' 6 North Carolina,"; and Pennsylvania,'5 have been
2 Code of Ala. t. 48, Sec. 52.
3 Vernon's Anno. Mo. Stat. Ch. 392, Sec. 240.
4 N. Y. Consol. L., N. Y. Stat. Ch. 48, Art. 5, Sec. 49.
5 Page's Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 4905.22, 4909.05.
6 Minn. Stat. Ch. 237.21.
7 Vernon's Civ. Stat. of Tex. t. 28, Ch. 10, Art. 1119.
s Miss. Code Anno. Sec. 7716-12.
9 Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Mississippi Public Service
Commission (Miss. Ch., June 19, 1958).
10 D. C. Code, t. 43-306.
11 Bonbright v. Geary Corp. Comm. of Ariz., 210 F. 44 (D. C., Ariz., 1913);
Arizona Corporation Commission v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 71
Ariz. 404, 228 P. 2d 749 (1951).
12 Application of Diamond State Tel. Co., 48 Del. 317, 103 A. 2d 304 (1953);
Application of Diamond State Tel. Co., 48 Del. 497, 107 A. 2d 786 (1954);
Application of Diamond State Tel. Co., 49 Del. 203, 8 P. U. R. 3d 291, 113 A.
2d 437 (1955); Re Diamond State Tel. Co., 21 P. U. R. 3d 417 (1958).
13 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 414 Ill. 275, 111 N. E.
2d 329 (1953); City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 4 Ill. 2d 554,
123 N. E. 2d 500 (1954).
14 Public Service Comm. v. Indiana Bell Tel, Co., 235 Ind. 1, 130 N. E. 2d
467 (1955).
15 Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 201 Md. 170,
97 P. U. R. (NS) 50, 93 A. 2d 249 (1952); Re Chesapeake and Potomac Tel.
Co. of Maryland, 22 P. U. R. 3d 321 (1958).
16 Tobacco River Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 109 Mont. 521, 98
P. 2d 886 (1940); Re Mountain States' Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 P. U. R. 3d 417(1960).
17 State ex rel. North Carolina Utilities Comm. v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 239 N. C. 333, 80 S. E. 2d 133 (1954).
'8 Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Comm., 153
Pa. Super. 475, 34 A. 2d 375 (1943); City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania




classified as "fair value" states because of court decisions using
a "fair value" standard. This accounts for the selected group of
fifteen "fair value" states used for this study.
The permissive group of seven states-Colorado, 9 Georgia,20
Kansas,21 Nebraska, 22 Oregon, 23 South Dakota,24 and Wyoming 25
-consists of those with valuation provisions but no decisive
post-Hope 26 case court decisions interpreting those provisions.
The "just and reasonable" group of twenty-seven jurisdic-
tions includes fourteen states with valuation provisions which
the courts or commissions have interpreted not to require "fair
value" and to permit use of "net investment" or some other non-
value rate base-Arkansas, 27 California, 28 District of Colum-
bia,29 Idaho,' 0  Kentucky,3 ' Massachusetts, 32 Nevada,3 3 New
Jersey,34 Oklahoma,3 5 South Carolina,'6  Tennessee,37 Utah,38
Washington," and Wisconsin. 40 As mentioned above, it also in-
19 Colo. Rev. St., Sec. 115-4-11.
20 Ga. Code Anno. t. 93-308.
21 Kans. Stat. Ch. 66, Art. 1, Sec. 128.
22 Rev. Stat. Nebr. Sec. 75-208.
23 Ore. Rev. Stat. Sec. 757.020.
24 So. Dak. Code, Sec. 52.0208.
25 Wyo. Stat., Sec. 37-21.
26 Federal Power Comm., v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 51 P. U. R.
NS 193, 88 L. Ed. 333, 64 S. Ct. 281 (1944).
27 City of Fort Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 220 Ark. 70, 247 S. W.
2d 474 (1952).
28 Re General Tel. Co. of California, 25 P. U. R. 3d 129 (1958).
29 Re Washington Gas Light Co., 24 P. U. R. 3d 417 (1958): Re Potomac
Electric Power Co., 28 P. U. R. 3d 206 (1959).
30 Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Jones, 75 Idaho 78, 7 P. U. R. 3d 367,
267 P. 2d 634 (1954).
3' Citizen's Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 247 S. W. 2d 510 (Ky. App.
1952).
32 New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 331 Mass. 604,
121 N. E. 2d 896 (1954).
33 Bell Tel. Co. of Nevada v. Public Service Comm., 70 Nev. 25, 253 P. 2d
602 (1953); Re Bell Tel. Co. of Nevada, 15 P. U. R. 3d 22 (1956).
34 New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 12 N. J. 568,
100 P. U. R. NS 379, 97 A. 2d 602 (1953).
35 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 204 Okla. 225, 230 P.
2d 260 (1951).
36 Coney v. Broad River Power Co., 171 S. Car. 377, 172 S. E. 437 (1933).
37 Re Southern Bell Tel. Co., 12 P. U. R. 3d 170 (1956); affd 14 P. U. R. 3d
278 (Tenn. Ch. 1956).
38 Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah Public Service Commission, 107 Utah
155, 56 P. U. R. NS 136, 152 P. 2d 542 (1944).
39 Washington Public Service Commission v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 25
P. U. R. 3d 18 (1958); Washington Public Service Comm. v. General
Telephone Co. of the Northwest, 30 P. U. R. 3d 145 (1959).
40 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., 24 P. U. R. 3d 314 (1958).
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cludes Mississippi, with a "fair value" statute4 1 and a "just and
reasonable" court decision.4 2 Finally, it includes two states-
Maine 43 and North Dakota 44-in which consideration of current
value is prohibited by statute, and ten states in which the only
statutory standard for telephone rates is that they shall be "just
and reasonable"-Florida, 4 5 Louisiana,4 6 Michigan,47 New Hamp-
shire, 48 New Mexico,49 Rhode Island,50 Vermont,5 1 Virginia,5 2
West Virginia, 5 3 and Connecticut.
54
Thus, to recapitulate, fifteen states have "fair value"; seven
states permit but do not require "value"; and the remaining
twenty-six specify only that the rates must be "just and reason-
able."
These three classifications are based on experience as well as
on the wording of the statutes or court decisions. Thus, New
Jersey is considered to be merely a "just and reasonable" state
because the New Jersey Supreme Court 55 accepts "net invest-
ment" as "fair value." The "fair value" group is a varied assort-
ment, including Iowa, where there is actually no regulation of
telephone rates; Ohio,56 with a statutory reconstruction cost rate
base; Maryland,5 7 which uses net original cost plus a token ad-
justment for current value; and New York,58 whose commission
recently refused to assign weight to reproduction cost in finding
the rate base, in spite of a "fair value" court decision.59
There is also a broad range of practice within the group con-
cerning the adjustment of items of operating expense and the
inclusion of certain rate base components, such as working
41 Supra, n. 8.
42 Supra, n. 9.
43 Maine Laws, Ch. 44, Rev. Sec. 18.
44 No. Dak. Rev. Code, Ch. 49-06, Sec. 49-0603.
45 Fla. Stat. Sec. 364.03.
46 La. Const., Art. 6, Sec. 4; La. Rev. Stat., Sec. 45-1167.
47 Comp. L. Mich., Sec. 460-54.
48 N. H. Rev. Stat. Anno. Ch. 374, See. 2.
49 N. Mex. Stat., Sec. 68-6-1.
50 Gen. L. R. I., Sec. 39-2-1.
51 Vt. Stat. Anno., t. 30, Sec. 216.
52 Code of Va., t. 56-235.
53 W. Va. Code, Art. 2, Sec. 2554.
54 Gen. Stat. Conn., t. 16, Ch. 277, Sec. 16-19.
55 Supra, n. 34.
55 Supra, n. 5.
5T Supra, n. 15.
58 In re New York Bell Tel. Co., 286 App. Div. 28, 8 P. U. R. 3d 229, 142
N. Y. S. 2d 68 (1955); Re New York Bell Tel. Co., 20 P. U. R. 3d 129 (1957).
59 New York Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 309 N. Y. 569,




capital, plant under construction, and property held for future
use. There are also marked differences in economic opportunity
among these states and in regulatory climate within them.
The dominant concept in the regulation of utility rates-the
heart and core of the regulatory process-is a fair rate of
return on a rate base (value ascribed to the utility's property
used and useful in furnishing service).
State and Federal statutes and constitutions are completely
silent as to a definition of this concept, except in the few states
where the composition of a "fair value" rate base is spelled out.
Nowhere in statutory law is fair rate of return defined. Only in
decisions of courts and commissions have the elements con-
sidered in determining rate of return been set forth.
The absence of a definition of rate of return in statutory law
may pose a threat to adequate utility earnings in the future, and
more seriously, may permit regulatory agencies to abandon the
rate base-rate of return concept for any other concept they
wish to use. The rapidity with which regulatory agencies sub-
sequent to the Hope case 60 abandoned "fair value" as a rate base,
even when required by statutory law, offers a lesson in point.
There is no reason to believe that a similar abandonment by the
United States Supreme Court of its pronouncements on a fair
rate of return would not be likewise followed. The time is ripe
for such an abandonment by the Supreme Court as the following
shows.
In 1876, the time of the Supreme Court's initial holding"'
concerning the authority of a governmental price fixing statute
under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution,
the court not only asserted that governmental regulation of rates
was within the States' police power but added that the deter-
mination of such rates was conclusive and not subject to judicial
review. The following year, 1877, the Court also rejected the
contention that regulated businesses were entitled to "just com-
pensation." 62
Less than a decade was to elapse before the Court, awaken-
ing to the consequences of leaving business to the mercy of the
State legislatures, began to reverse itself. Thus in 1886, in the
Railroad Commission Cases6 3 the Court warned that a state can-
not "do that which in law amounts to a taking of private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation, or without due
process of law." By treating "due process of law" and "just com-
pensation" as synonymous, the Court, contrary to the 1877 deci-
60 Supra, n. 26.
61 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
62 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616 (1877).
63 Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. Ed. 636, 6 S. Ct. 334
(1886).
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sion,64 held that the imposition of a rate so low as to damage or
diminish private property ceased to be an exercise of a States
police power and became one of eminent domain.
Subsequent decisions contributed to this eminent domain
concept, culminating in the holding of the 1898 Ames' Case,65
that the requirements of due process are not met unless a court
not only reviews the reasonableness of a rate but also determines
whether the rate permits the utility to earn a fair rate of return
on a fair valuation of its investment.
Thus, the holdings of the Supreme Court continued until the
Hope Case in 1944.66 During that interval few lawyers felt it
necessary to incorporate bodily into statutory law the "fair value"
concept. The statutory standard "just and reasonable" was suf-
ficient because under court decisions it meant a fair rate of return
on a fair value rate base, which gave effective weight to current
price levels. This ended in 1944. At that time the Supreme
Court, as a result of three decisions, arrived at a point not very
far removed from its initial holdings in 187667 and in 1877.68
First in 1934 in the Nebbia case,6 9 the Court declared, "that
prices established for business in general would invite judicial
condemnation only if arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt." The sec-
ond and third cases came in 1942 and 1944. By holding in 194270
that the "constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the
service of any single formula" and in 1944 in the Hope7' Case
that "it is the result reached not the method employed which is
controlling, (and that) if the total effect of the rate order cannot
be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the
act is at an end," the Court in effect abdicated from the position
that rate fixing is an exercise of the power of eminent domain
and reasserted its initial (Munn) police power doctrine.
It is true the Court has not specifically surrendered its right
to declare that low rates could contravene the due process clause;
some of the members of the Court have wanted to do so. In the
Natural Gas Pipeline Case,7 2 Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
proposed to travel the road all the way back to the Munn Case73
64 Supra, n. 62.
65 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L.Ed. 819, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
66 Supra, n. 26.
67 Supra, n. 61.
68 Supra, n. 62.
69 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A. L. R.
1469 (1934).
70 Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Amer., 315 U. S.
575, 42 P. U. R. NS 129, 89 L.Ed. 1037, 62 S. Ct. 736 (1942).
71 Supra, n. 26.
72 Supra, n. 70.




and deprive all courts of the power to void rates on Federal con-
stitutional grounds. Earlier, in a 1939 case,7 4 Justice Frankfurter
adopted a similar position, but in his dissent in the Hope Case he
backed down.
Nevertheless, though the majority of the court have not fully
subscribed to a complete return to Munn, the majority in Hope
did concur in Justice Douglas' reliance in that case upon the
police power concept in both Munn and Nebia, when he said,
"Rate-making is indeed but one species of price fixing. The fixing
of prices, like other applications of the police power, may reduce
the value of property which is being regulated. But the fact that
value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid."
The few rate-making criteria for adequate earnings in Hope,
or the right to judicial review, could be dropped at any time for
the standard set forth in Nebbia: ". . . arbitrary, discriminatory
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free
to adopt." The criteria in Hope, some experts argue, do not re-
quire the rate base-rate of return method, nor are the criteria as
likely to insure as adequate a level of earnings as allowed by
the Supreme Court in a 1923 decision,7 5 a landmark rate of re-
turn case, which it is interesting to note has been avoided by the
Court in Hope and subsequent rate case decisions, though there
have been but a few.
Since it is apparent that utilities would secure more equitable
and adequate earning under pre-Hope standards, and since
future Supreme Court decisions might swing further to the
Munn standards, it is time to statutorily define an equitable and
adequate rate of return.
Will utilities in the future regret their failures of the present
because nothing was done to bring about standardization of
proper criteria for a fair rate of return upon a current property
rate base throughout the States and Federal Government? Why
should the police power doctrine continue, since it is almost com-
pletely void of objective standards in respect to establishing rates
of return consistent with current economic conditions.
It is a well known fact that regulated companies, utilities
particularly, which have the best earnings, provide for their
customers the best product and service. Why not, therefore, es-
tablish an act in all states similar in effect to other uniform acts?
This uniform act should incorporate standards which provide
for the consumer the best product or service, for the investor the
best return on his capital, and for the regulatory bodies the best
framework within which the preceding may be obtained.
74 Driscoll, Pennsylvania Public Utilities Comm. v. Edison Light & Power
Co., 307 U. S. 104, 83 L.Ed. 1134, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939).
75 Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm. of
State of W. Va., 262 U. S. 679, 67 L.Ed. 1176, 43 S. Ct. 675 (1923).
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